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ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO PERSONS
INJURED UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
MURRAY S. MONROE*
I. INTRODUCTION
A commercial enterprise [hereinafter "victim"], which is hindered in
its purchasing, manufacturing or marketing by what it considers to be
antitrust violations by others, has a number of weapons at hand which
it may utilize to combat the alleged violator [hereinafter "violator"]. The
one that comes most readily to mind is a treble damage suit with its various
ramifications. Such suits have grown in number and sophistication in recent
years to the point that the antitrust bar could legitimately be classed as
a "growth" profession.' However, direct action of that form is niot the
only alternative available to the victim. What action, if any, it decides
to take will depend upon a number of considerations, including the serious-
ness of the alleged offense, the effect it has had or is likely to have on
the victim's business, the difficulty of proving the offense and its impact,
the financial and managerial resources which the victim is willing to devote
to "collateral" activity of this sort, the resistance which it is apt to encounter
from the violator, the number of skeletons in the victim's own closets,
and a number of others. Many of these considerations are inherently prac-
tical-not legal.
The basic purpose of this article is to outline some of the alternative
courses of action available to the victim of an antitrust violation. Extremely
important to the selection of an alternative are the practical problems in
pursuing it to a successful conclusion. These alternatives involve greatly
disparate amounts of effort by the victim and probably will yield greatly
different rewards. The limited scope of this article does not permit me
to detail the important practical difference in the alternatives; however,
it is hoped that some "feel" for these differences will be gained by the
reader.
II. LITIGATION To REDRESS
ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
A. Basic Requirements of Action
Basically any person who is injured in his business or property by rea-
* Member of the Ohio Bar. This article is based on a speech made at the Sixth Annual
Antitrust Institute, Ohio State Bar Association, on November 3, 1972.
1 Betweeen 1890 and 1940 there were only 13 private actions in which the plaintiff recov-
ered. By the middle 19 6 0's, there were several thousand private treble damage actions pending.
The Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association has also grown enormously since its
inception in 1950. See Kirkpatrick, Evaluation of the Claim, Preparation of the Suit, Discov-
ery, and Privileges, 38 ANTITRUST L.J. 4 (1968).
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son of conduct forbidden by the antitrust laws may sue to redress the al-
leged wrong.' The private plaintiff must establish: (1) a violation of the
antitrust laws; (2) a pecuniary injury to his business or property; and
(3) a causal connection between the violation and the injury.- The injury
must not be "indirect," "secondary," "remote," or "derivative." Some courts
have formulated the theory of direct injury in terms of requiring that
the plAintiff be an "object" or "target" of the violation.4 Not only must
the plaintiff prove these elements, but the complaint must also allege facts
which will satisfy the requirements.5 If the plaintiff fails to allege such
threshold prerequisites, he lacks "standing to sue," and a pretrial motion
to dismiss or summary judgment is in order.'
A private party does not have a right of action under every statute
which may be considered to be an "antitrust law" in the broadest sense.
Private actions are available under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, parts
of the Robinson-Patman Act, the Wilson Tariff Act, and possibly some
other statutes.7 Such actions specifically cannot be brought under either
§ 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act.8
Similarly, a private party has no right to bring an action for an alleged
violation of a government decree.'
2 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
3 Schwabe Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 909 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962); Pollack, The Injury and Causation Elements of Private Antitrust
Action, 21 ABA ANTrmusr SEC 341, 342 (1962).
4 Volasco Prod. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 907 (1963); Elyria Lorain Broadcasting Co. v. Lorain Journal Co., 298 F.2d 356,
359 (6th Cir. 1961).
5 Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49, 51 (7th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 830 (1949); Beegle v. Thomspon, 138 F.2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1944).
6 See Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
7 Clayton Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355
U.S. 373 (1958). Section 7 of the Clayton Act is an "antitrust law." A private action
may be brought for treble damages arising from an acquisition alleged to be illegal under
that section. See Gottesman v. General Motors, 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cit. 1969); Champion
Spark Plug Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. 3J 73,553 (N.D. Ohio);
Note, Treble Damages for Violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 404
(1971).
Some "antitrust statutes" specifically grant a private right of action comparable to that
of the Clayton Act. The Panama Canal Act, 15 U.S.C. § 31 (1970), provides in part as
follows:
No vessel permitted to engage in the coastwise or foreign trade of the United States
shall be permitted to enter or pass through the Panama Canal if such ship is owned,
chartered, operated or controlled by any person or company which is doing business
in violation of ... the [Sherman Act]. Suit may be brought by any shipper....
8See Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958); Gold Fuel Service,
Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 306 F.2d 61, 62 (3d Cir. 1962); Chusid & Co. v. Marshall
Leeman & Co., 326 F. Supp. 1043 (S.D.N.Y 1971); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 318 F. Supp.
785 (N.D. Cal. 1970). In addition, if the action relates to a regulated industry, the various
regulatory statutes relating to such industry should be carefully examined since they may
grant a partial or total exemption, e.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570,
574 (1952); Laveson v. TWA, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 74,290 (3d Cir. 1972).
9 Paul M. Harrod Co. v. A. B. Dick Co., 194 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
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B. Forms of Action
The most prevalent form of private action is an action for damages
under § 4 of the Clayton Act,' ° although in particular cases it may be
appropriate to bring an action for declaratory judgment. The latter will
usually involve the construction of a license or other contract which argu-
ably violates the antitrust laws." Declaratory judgments are usually not
brought if the alleged violation is predicated on a course of conduct or if a
violation is clearly a per se violation.2
In recent years, due to the amendment of rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, many actions are brought as class actions. Gen-
erally speaking, a member of a class may institute a suit as a representative
of the class if he can establish the following: (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impractical; (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class which predominate over questions affecting
individual members; (3) the claims of the representative party are typical
of the claims of the class; (4) the representative will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class; and (5) the class action is superior to
other available methods for adjudicating the controversy. Virtually all
of these requirements have resulted in considerable litigation as to their
scope. Since some aspects of the problem are treated in other articles
in this symposium, I will only deal in this article with a bare outline of the
problems.
The first requirement is one of numerosity. The potential number
of claimants must neither be too large nor too small. If the claimants
are few in number, it is practicable to join them all, and a class action
is unnecessary. If the number is too large, the class is unmanageable
and courts have dismissed class actions for that reason. Whether the class
is too large or too small varies from case to case, and (not surprisingly)
10 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Some of the judgments and settlements under this section
have been erroneous, e.g., TWA, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Ohio
Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. 5 71,123 (R.D. Pa.).
11 An action was brought to declare a 20 year contract valid under antitrust laws in
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d. 766 (6th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds,
365, U.S. 320 (1961). See also Intercontinental Container Transport Corp. v. New York Ship.
Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970).
12 In addition to the forms of action mentioned in the text, shareholders have brought
a number of derivative suits to redress injuries to the corporation. Since the shareholder
is suing on behalf of the corporation and not for his injury as a shareholder, the loss is
"direct" and not "secondary." As a result, the plaintiff has met the requirement that there
be a direct injury to business or property. E.g., Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d
297 (3d Cir. 1962); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 171 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Shareholders have also brought derivative suits to enjoin a violation by the corporation,
Ash v. International Bus. Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), and also to hold directors
liable for breach of fiduciary duty attributable to the antitrust violation, Simon v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202. 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 267 App.
Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78,
188 A.2d 125 (1963).
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the cases dealing with this issue are not consistent. A class of 800 members
has been disallowed as too small' 3 while a class of 15 members has been
upheld.' 4 A class of 6,000,000 members has been held to be manageable
in one case'5 and a class of 1,500,000 members unmanageable in another. 6
However, the trend seems to reflect a general increase in the minimum
number of class members and a decrease in the maximum number.
Class actions have been denied for cases in which the claims of the
plaintiff conflicted with the claims of other members of the class.' 7  Even
in price fixing cases, class action status may be denied if the plaintiffs
claim to represent two different levels of distribution. Basically, in a price
fixing case, the purchaser who is in privity with the price fixer recovers
for the overcharge. If the overcharge is passed on, only the subpurchaser
may recover. The impact is upon one or the other, but not both. There
undoubtedly will be an irreconcilable conflict as to recovery between the
purchaser and subpurchaser, thus the plaintiff should not represent them
both. 8  Similarly, in an action charging price discrimination at the buy-
er's level, class action status has been denied if the plaintiff seeks to repre-
sent both favored and disfavored buyers.' 9
13 Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971) (126 members); Utah
v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Holly Springs Funeral
Home, Inc. v. United Funeral Service, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (10-12
members). See also Judy Van Allen v. Circle K Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 74,185 (C.D.
Cal. 1972); Gaines v. Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,860 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (three or four members). William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 49 F.R.D. 34 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (suggesting that a class of 460 may be too small to war-
rant class action status).
Plaintiff has a positive burden of showing that the number is so large that it is impractica-
ble to join the members of the class in the suit. Kinzler v. New York Stock Exchange, 1971
Trade Cas. 5 73,622 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
14Weingartner v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 431 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1000 (1971).
15Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 1971 Trade Cas. 73,563 (S.D.N.Y.). But see Phila-
delphia v. American Oil Co., 1971 Trade Cas. 5 73,625 (D.N.J.).
10 Hackett v. General Host Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 5 73,800 (3d Cir.).
17 "The plaintiff cannot maintain his action as a class suit when his interests are antagonistic
to the interests of the persons he purports to represent." Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419
F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1970). "Where the alleged class contends dual conflicting interests,
a class action is inappropriate." Traylor v. Marine Corp., 328 F. Supp. 382, 385 (E.D.
Wis. 1971). See also Holly Springs Funeral Home, Inc. v. United Funeral Service, Inc.,
303 F. Supp. 128, 134 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Horwitz v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,
293 F. Supp. 1092 (W.D. Okla. 1968); New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.,
44 F.R.D. 584, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
I8 See Obron v. Union Camp Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 9 73,909 (E.D. Mich. 1972);
Balmac Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 74,235 (N.D. Calif.
1972); Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971).
19 Further, plaintiff's complaint also charges discrimination in favor of some first-run
exhibitors as against others in the screening of pictures. Yet both groups-the alleged
(but unidentified) favored exhibitors and the alleged (but also unidentified) mis-
treated exhibitors-are both members of the purported class. Indeed, one exhib-
itor might be asserted to be favored in the case of one picture or in one city and
discriminated against as regards another picture or in another city. Under these
circumstances plaintiff cannot adequately represent the entire class.
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Class actions have also been denied when common questions do not
predominate and individual questions do. Cases under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act involving price discrimination at the buyer's level have been
denied on this basis. ° In such situations generally a determination
whether there was an adverse effect on competition and other facts would
be peculiar to each individual plaintiff. Similarly, class action status has
been denied in cases alleging an illegal tie-in when the basis of the tie-
in is coercion, which most frequently arises in suits by a franchisee against
the franchisor. Whether or not the individual franchisee was coerced into
buying unwanted products was said in one such case to be a fact peculiar
to each franchisee.2'
In addition, class action status may be denied if the attorney solic-
ited representatives of the class. As specifically noted in the Manual for
Complex and Multidistrict Litigation:
The class action under Rule 23 is subject to abuse, intentional and
inadvertent, unless procedures are devised and employed to anticipate
abuse. Among the potential abuses of the class action processes are the
following: (1) solicitation of direct legal representation of potential and
actual class members who are not formal parties to the class action; (2)
solicitation of funds and agreements to pay fees and expenses from poten-
tial and actual class members who are not formal parties to the class action;
(3) solicitation by formal parties of requests by class members to opt out
in class actions . . . ; and (4) unauthorized direct or indirect communica-
tions from counsel or a party, which may misrepresent the status, pur-
poses and effects of the action and of Court orders therein, may confuse
actual and potential class members, and create impressions which may
reflect adversely on the Court or the administration of justice.2
The courts have been increasingly concerned about the mounting evi-
dence of rule 23 abuse.23 One court has held that if only one class
representative had been solicited, "prosecution of this suit as a class action
would constitute an abuse of Rule 23 ..... 24 . While the court refused
to certify it as a class action, the case was allowed to proceed as any
William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 49 F.R.D. 35, 40 (E.D.
Pa. 1969). See also Bel Air Markets v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 538, 542 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
20 Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1970); Bel Air Markets
v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 55 F.R.D 538, 542 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Baim & Blank, Inc. v.
Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); ci. State Wholesale Grocers
v. Great A & P Tea Co., 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
2 1 1n re 7-Eleven Franchise Litigation, 1972 Trade Cas. 5 74,156 (N.D. Cal). See also
Abercrombie v. Lur's Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. 5 74,118 (S.D. Fla.); Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 50
F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
2 2 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 24.1 (CCH 1970).
23 "The permissive use of the class action permitted by Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure was never intended as a device to enable client solicitation, nor should it be permitted
to be used for that purpose." Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108,
111 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
2 4 Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, 54 F.R.D. 237, 240 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
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other case. In Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc.,25 plaintiff's coun-
sel communicated with potential class members and sought their concur-
rence to a class suit. He did not solicit them as class representatives nor
under circumstances for which he would obtain a fee from them. The
district court dismissed the entire action, but the court of appeals reversed.
The appellate court appeared to be influenced by the fact that the district
court dismissed the case and the fact that counsel was not to obtain a
fee from those persons he had solicited.
C. Forms of Relief
The action may take the form of a damage action in which case the
plaintiff is entitled to recover triple damages, his costs and attorneys' fees
under § 4 of the Clayton Act. The plaintiff may also elect to sue for in-
junctive relief. 6 A few permanent injunctions have been issued in private
antitrust cases,27 including actions to enjoin alleged violations of § 7 of the
Clayton Act. 8 There is also authority that divestiture is an appropriate
form of relief in private cases,2 9 although it apparently has only been
granted once.
III. ACTION To ENFORCE THE ANTITRUST LAWS
IN LITIGATION BROUGHT BY OTHERS
A. Litigation Brought Against the Victim
The victim may not desire to bring a suit in order to redress this
25 458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972).
2 6 Any person ... shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws ... when and under
the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct
that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing
such proceedings....
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). See Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
Plaintiff may also seek and be granted a preliminary injunction; however in such cases the
plaintiff must meet the usual requirements for obtaining such relief, such as proof of irreparable
injury. See Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cit. 1962); N.W.
Controls Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 317 F. Supp. 698 (D. Del. 1970).
2 7 Volasco Prod. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 346 F.2d 661, 667 (6th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965) (Robinson-Patman Act); Adelman v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 296 F.2d 308 (5th Cit. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 851 (1962) (conspiracy of monopoly);
Basle Theaters v. Warner Bros. Pictures Dist. Corp., 168 F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Pa. 1958)
(conspiracy); Advance Bus. Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM, 1970 Trade Cas. 5 73,045 (D.
Md. 1968).
2 8 American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958);
International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 5 74,094 (D.
Hawaii). See also Riccheri v. Meister Brau, Inc., 431 F.2d 1211 (9th Cit. 1970) (an unsuc-
cessful suit to enjoin an acquisition of plaintiff's supplier).
29 International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 9 74,094
(D. Hawaii); Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., -152 F. Supp. 387, 400 (S.D.N.Y.
1957). But see American Commercial Barge Line Co. v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 204 F.
Supp. 451 (S.D. Ohio 1962); Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a
Remedy for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 49 MINN. L. REV. 267 (1964).
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wrong, but instead may elect to "lay back." If the violator takes the
initiative, the victim may then counter-attack under the antitrust laws.
This type of situation most frequently arises when there is a contractual
relationship between the parties which imposes an unwarranted burden
on the victim. In such event, the victim may simply repudiate the contract
and, in effect, declare it null and void. 0 If the violator seeks to enforce
the contract or otherwise seeks to enforce a violation of the antitrust laws
by litigation, the defendant may interpose the antitrust violation as a de-
fense. For instance, in Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp.,", Associated
Press furnished Taft-Ingalls four newswire services under a two-year con-
tract. Taft-Ingalls believed that the contract constituted an illegal tie-
in and repudiated the contract during its term. Associated Press sued for
damages which, in effect, were the profits it would have realized if Taft-
Ingalls had continued to take the service during the remainder of the term
of the contract. The court held that Taft-Ingalls' action was improper
since to award damages under these circumstances would have been the
equivalent of enforcing a contract which violated the antitrust laws. One
caveat is in order. If plaintiff has completed performance of the contract
and delivered the goods required by the contract or performed the services
required by the contract, the defendant cannot refuse to pay. 2 As the
Supreme Court succinctly put it in Kelly v. Kosuga, "the courts are to
be guided by the overriding general principle 'of preventing people from
getting other people's property for nothing when they purport to be buying
it.' ,,33
More frequently, the alleged antitrust violation of the plaintiff is un-
related or virtually unrelated to the action which plaintiff has brought
against the defendant. While defendant may not defend on the ground
of the antitrust violation, the question arises whether a counterclaim for
triple damages may be asserted against the plaintiff in such action. The
majority of cases have held that this cannot be done in an action for
the price of goods, the most recent of which is Ford Motor Co. v. Strick-
land,34 a diversity action brought by a manufacturer against the distributor
30 Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1970);
Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 768-69 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 820 (1965); Farben-fabriken Bayer A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 307 F.2d 210 (3d
Cir. 1962); Kentucky Rural Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Moloney Elec. Co., 282 F.2d 481 (6th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 812 (1960); Western Geophysical Co. v. Bolt Associates,
Inc., 305 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Conn. 1969).
31340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965).
32Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, 187 F.2d
919 (5th Cir. 1951) reh'g denied, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951).
3 358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959).
34 Ford Motor Co. v. Strickland, 302 F. Supp. 154 (S.D. Ga. 1969); accord, Tenna Corp. v.
Rego Radio & Electronics Corp., 270 F. Supp. 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (defendant's motion to
bring in additional defendant on antitrust counterclaim denied on the ground that an antitrust
violation is not a defense to an action for goods sold and delivered). See also Baltimore &
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on an open account for equipment sold to the distributor. The distributor
counterclaimed for treble damages, but plaintiff's motion to dismiss the
counterclaim was granted. The court stated that "a defendant cannot file
,a counterclaim under the antitrust laws to an action by plaintiff to recover
the price of goods sold, but must institute [a] separate suit for treble
damages.1 35 Several cases reach the opposite result,"0 and it is submitted
that they represent the better view. Rule 13(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure relating to permissive counterclaims provides that "a
pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an imposing party
not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim." To require the defendant to bring a sepa-
rate action simply results in there being two suits instead of one. As a
matter of practice, this type of counterclaim seems to be filed frequently
without objection being raised.37
B. Litigation Brought by the Government
Basically, a private party may not intervene or participate in an anti-
trust suit brought by the government even though the private party may
be directly affected by the outcome of that litigation. 8 If the government
litigation has proceeded to the consent decree stage, the Department of
Justice's present policy is to leave the consent decree unfiled for 30 days
before it becomes final. The ostensible purpose of this procedure is to
allow private parties who may be affected by the decree to comment on
it0' To a certain extent, this procedure allows the private party to influ-
O.R.R. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 196 F. Supp. 724, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Barnsdall
Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. Wis. 1940); Independent Oil
Co. v. Barrett, 79 F. Supp. 831 (D.D.C. 1939).
35 302 F. Supp. 154.
36Brown Paper Mill Co. v. Agar Mfg. Corp., 1 F.R.D. 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); accord,
Channel Marketing, Inc. v. Telepro Indus., Inc., 45 F.R.D. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In Hardrives
Co. v. East Coast Asphalt Corp., 166 So.2d 810 (Fla. App. 1964), the court held that the
Florida rules of civil procedure permitted the defendant to assert a counterclaim alleging
a violation of a Florida antitrust statute in a suit for the purchase price of asphalt, even
though it held that such a claim did not constitute a defense to the action.
37 E.g., Oxford Indus. Inc. v. Graymar Co., 1972 Trade Cas. 5 74,175(D. Md. 1971).
An antitrust claim cannot be brought in the state court. An antitrust counterclaim therefore
cannot be brought in the state court or, if brought, removed from that court to a federal
court. See Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 5 TRADE REG.
REP. 5 73,933 (9th Cir. 1972). A creditor who learns that he will be met by an antitrust
counterclaim if he sues on the debt should consider filing his suit in the state court.
38New York v. United States, 390 U.S. 715 (1968); United States v. Blue Chip Stamp
Co., 272 F. Supp. 432, 439 (C.D. Cal. 1967). A contrary result was reached in two cases.
In Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967), the intervener
successfully upset a decree to which both the government and the defendent had assented.
In United States v. Darling-Delaware Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. 5 73,818 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), plaintiffs
in a triple damage suit appeared as amicus curiae and opposed the acceptance of nolo contendere
pleas and in the alternative requested an order impounding the grand jury documents. The
court impounded the documents.
3928 C.F.R. § 50.1(b) (1972).
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ence the outcome of the litigation. However, it is debatable how effective
the procedure has been as far as the private parties have been concerned.
In some cases, private parties have also been allowed to participate as
amicus curiae at the arraignment or plea in criminal antitrust cases, but
this is usually limited to public bodies.40
IV. COMPLAINTS To THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
The victim of an antitrust violation may always complain to the De-
partment of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission.41 Representatives
of the Department of Justice have informally stated that many, if not the
majority, of investigations instituted by the Department arise from such
complaints.' No particular form is required for the complaint. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission apparently receives at least several thousand com-
plaints a year, and while the size of its staff and its resources do not per-
mit it to take action on any great number of these complaints, one mem-
ber of the staff has indicated that something on the order of ten percent
of the complaints lead to formal action4 Again no particular form or
procedure is required to lodge a complaint.44 If well-founded, this type of
action seems to be effective.
V. SELF HELP-DEFENSIVE ACTION IN THE MARKET
Rather than take any of the action referred to above, the victim may
simply desire to retaliate in the marketplace. There are a number of cir-
cumstances in which this can be done, with varying risks. As indicated
above, a.party to an illegal contract probably may repudiate the contract
and incur a minimum risk of being held liable on obligations which have
not yet accrued.45 Similarly, a distributor, franchisee, or other merchant
who has limited bargaining strength may often accept an agreement which
violates the antitrust laws with a minimum risk. He may even retain
40 United States v. Darling-Delaware Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. 5 73,818 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
United States v. American Bakeries Co., 284 F. Supp. 864 (W.D. Mich. 1968); United States
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 45 F.R.D. 477 (W.D. Pa. 1968); cf. United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 41 F.R.D. 342 (ED. Mo. 1967); United States v. Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc., 1967 Trade Cas. 5 72,256 (N.D. Ill.). See also Cascade Natural Gas
Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
41 The government later may be compelled to disclose information as to informers. See
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Burlington, 351
F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Aluminum Ltd., 268 F. Supp. 758 (D.N.J.
1966); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 5 70,074 (E.D. Ky.).
42 Steinhouse, The Antitrust Investigation, 29 OHio ST. L.J. 330 (1968); Williams, Investiga-
tions by the Department of Justice, 29 ABA ANnrTRusT SEC. 50 (1965).
4 3 Williams, Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission, 29 ABA ANTITRUST SEC
71 (1965).
4 4 FTC Procedures and Rules of Practice, Part 2-Nonadjudicative Procedur'es, 3 TRADE
REG. REP. 5 9807 (1972).
45 See note 30 supra.
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the right to sue the other party to the agreement at a later date for violation
of the antitrust laws. 6 For instance, a manufacturer may need to practice
an invention in order to stay in business. A patent license may be offered
to him only with the condition that he buy products required in practicing
the invention from the patentee-at a price in excess of what he can
buy them for in the open market. Under these circumstances he may
have to enter into the license agreement in order to survive . Even though
he knowingly becomes a party to an illegal agreement, the risk he incurs
of being held in violation of the antitrust laws is minimal, and he probably
creates a cause of action against the patentee on his own behalf.41 The
manufacturer, in addition, has a further alternative. In this circumstance
the patentee is misusing his patent, thus the other manufacturer probably
may practice the invention without a license. If he is then sued by the
patentee, he could defend on the basis that the patent has been misused
and that the patentee may not maintain an action for infringement during
the period of the misuse." This alternative obviously involves greater
risk than would obtaining the license. In another context, if a competitor
is discriminating on prices to the detriment of a manufacturer, the manu-
facturer probably may meet those prices49 and retain its market position
in that manner.
While self help may be useful in some situations, its utility has definite
limits. In the first place, a manufacturer may not join an illegal conspiracy
simply because its competitors are so involved." In addition, there are
some circumstances in which there is no effective right of self help. For
instance, a franchisee whose valuable franchise has been terminated for
an illegal reason may have no effective remedy in the marketplace.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
'A manufacturer or other merchant who is aggrieved by violation of
the antitrust laws has a number of alternatives available to him as to
the manner in which he may attempt to redress the wrong. These include
various forms of litigation, a limited ability to intervene in suits brought
by others, complaints to the various agencies, and defensive action in the
marketplace, among others. The type of action to be selected by the victim
depends upon the nature of the violation and its effect on his business.
46 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
47 Discretion probably dictates that he first write the patentee or prospective licensee and
request that the offending provision be omitted from the license.
48 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Kobey Inc. v. Dempsey
Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
49 Nationl Dairy Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 977 (1968); Di-Wal, Inc. v. Fibreboard Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. 5 73,155 (N.D. Cal);
LaRue, Meeting Competition and Other Defenses Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 25 BUS.
LAw. 1037 (1970).
50 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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However, the considerations go much further, including particularly the
very practical problems created by engaging in long and protracted liti-
gation with a strong adversary. The selection of the proper type of action
involves a balancing of the considerations and presents a tremendous op-
portunity for counsel to exerise his ingenuity so as to chart a course which
will redress the wrong without submerging the client in a morass of litiga-
tion and expense.
